1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT			
2	EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION			
3	United States of America,			
4	Plaintiff,			
5	-v- Case No. 19-20652			
6	D-1 James Letko,			
7	D-2 Steven King, D-3 Rami Lazeki,			
8	D-4 Patricia Flannery, D-5 Katherine Peterson,			
9	Defendants.			
10	/			
11	MOTION HEARING September 10, 2020			
12	-			
13	BEFORE THE HONORABLE DAVID M. LAWSON United States District Judge			
14	HEARING CONDUCTED VIA VIDEO CONFERENCE			
15	ALL PARTIES APPEARING REMOTELY			
16	APPEARANCES:			
17	FOR THE PLAINTIFF: MALISA CHOKSHI DUBAL JOHN McCORMACK			
18	United States Attorney's Office 211 West Fort Street, Suite 2001			
19	Detroit, Michigan 48226			
20	FOR THE DEFENDANT GEORGE B. DONNINI JAMES LETKO: THEODORE R. EPPEL			
21	Butzel Long 150 West Jefferson, Suite 100			
22	Detroit, Michigan 48226			
23	(Appearances continued to following page)			
24	To Obtain a Certified Transcript Contact:			
25	Rene L. Twedt, CSR-2907, RDR, CRR, CRC www.transcriptorders.com			

1	APPEARANCES CONTINUE):
2		
3	FOR THE DEFENDANT	Federal Community Defender 613 Abbot Street
4	STEVEN KING:	
5		Detroit, Michigan 48226
6	FOR THE DEFENDANT RAMI LAZEKI:	JAMES W. BURDICK Burdick Law, P.C. 1760 South Telegraph Road Suite 300 Bloomfield Hills, Michigan 48302
7		
8		
9	FOR THE DEFENDANT PATRICIA FLANNERY:	
10		
11		
12		2001010, IIIoIIIgaii 10220
13	FOR THE DEFENDANT KATHERINE PETERSON:	
14		
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		

1	TABLE OF CONTENTS	
2	MATTER	PAGE
3	MOTION HEARING	
4	MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT ONE	. 7
5	Argument by Mr. Eppel	. 14
6		• + /
7	MOTION TO COMPEL DISCLOSURE OF BRADY MATERIALS Argument by Mr. Doninni	
8	Argument by Mr. McCormack	
9	MOTION TO STRIKE SURPLUSAGE	
10	Argument by Mr. Doninni	. 48
11	Further Argument by Mr. Doninni	
12	MOTION FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS Argument by Mr. Berman	. 56
13	Argument by Mr. Doninni	. 59
14	Argument by Mr. McCormack	
15	MOTION TO SEVER	. 70
16	Argument by Ms. Webster	. 72
17	Argument by Ms. Dubal	
18	CERTIFICATE OF COURT REPORTER	. 86
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		

```
Detroit, Michigan
 2
     September 10, 2020
 3
     10:58 a.m.
 4
               THE COURT: Court is in session. This is the United
 5
      States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.
 6
 7
               This is Case Number 19-20652, United States of
      America versus James Letko and others.
 8
 9
               We are here today via videoconferencing. I find that
      the proceedings cannot be conducted in person without serious
10
11
      jeopardy to public health.
12
               The motion hearing is being conducted via video,
13
      because I also find that further delaying these proceedings
      would cause harm to the interests of justice.
14
15
               Before we begin, would the Government put its
16
      appearance on the record, please?
17
               MS. DUBAL: Yes, your Honor. Good afternoon.
18
      My name is Malisa Dubal. I'm appearing on behalf of the
      Government.
19
20
               And John McCormack is appearing or is on the phone as
      well on behalf of the Government.
21
22
               THE COURT: All right. Mr. McCormack apparently is
23
      not able to communicate with us, however.
24
               Mr. Donnini, please, your appearance on behalf of
25
      your client.
```

```
1
               MR. DONNINI: Yes, your Honor. George Donnini, and
 2
      I'll go ahead and on behalf of T.R. Eppel, on behalf of
 3
      Mr. Jim Letko, who is also participating.
 4
               THE COURT: All right. And for Defendant King.
 5
               MS. WEBSTER: Good afternoon, your Honor.
 6
      Webster on behalf of Mr. King.
 7
               THE COURT: And for Defendant Lazeki.
 8
               MR. BURDICK: Good afternoon, your Honor. James
 9
      Burdick appearing on behalf of Mr. Lazeki who is, as you can
10
      see, seated behind me.
11
               THE COURT: Yes. Lazeki. Pardon me.
12
      mispronounced his name and I apologize.
13
               Mr. Burdick, is it possible for you to raise your
14
      volume?
15
               MR. BURDICK: If somebody will tell me how.
                                                            DeDay,
16
      can you help me here?
17
               THE COURT: Or get closer to the microphone.
18
               MR. BURDICK: Oh, let's see. Let's see if I can pull
19
      this.
20
               How about now; is that any better?
21
               THE COURT: Slightly better.
22
               Ms. Twedt, can you hear Mr. Burdick all right?
23
         (Discussion held off the record.)
24
               THE COURT: Thank you.
25
               And appearance for Defendant Flannery.
```

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

```
MR. Larene:
                    Yes, sir. Deday LaRene on behalf of
Ms. Flannery, who is participating and whose unsmiling visage
is available.
         THE COURT:
                    All right.
         MR. LaRENE: Smiling now.
         THE COURT:
                    Thank you.
         And on behalf of Ms. Peterson.
         MR. BERMAN: Good afternoon, your Honor. Mark A.
Berman on behalf of Katherine Peterson, who is sitting to my
right slightly behind me.
         THE COURT: All right. We have Defendant Letko's
motion to compel disclosure of Brady materials, to strike
surplusage, and to dismiss/strike Count 1 of the indictment.
We have Defendant Peterson's motion for a bill of particulars.
And we have Defendant King's motion to sever.
         We will begin with Defendant Letko's motion to compel
disclosure of Brady materials, which is Docket Number 82.
        Mr. Donnini.
         MR. DONINNI: Thank you, your Honor.
        MS. DUBAL: Your Honor. Your Honor, I apologize.
         May I ask if your Honor would just implore the
Government, if we could just start on the motions that I
intended on handling today in the hopes that Mr. McCormack
will be able to figure out his technical issues by the time
that we are finished with those arguments? If your Honor
```

```
1
      would implore the Government. I apologize for interrupting,
 2
      but I'm wondering if that would be an option.
 3
               THE COURT: Well, it is problematic because of the
 4
      way I have these prepared.
 5
               MS. DUBAL:
                           Okay.
 6
               THE COURT: Let's see. Let me just turn to
 7
      Mr. Eppel, then, on the motion to dismiss Count 1 of the
      indictment.
 8
 9
               Were you going to argue that one, Ms. Dubal?
10
               MS. DUBAL: Yes, your Honor. I plan on arguing the
11
      motion to dismiss, the motion to strike surplusage, and --
12
               THE COURT: All right. Then we'll take that one.
               Mr. Eppel, you may proceed.
13
14
               MR. EPPEL:
                          Okay. Thank you, your Honor.
15
               MS. DUBAL:
                          Thank you.
16
               MR. EPPEL: Can you hear me okay?
               THE COURT:
17
                          Yes.
18
               MR. EPPEL:
                                  So I know your Honor has read the
                          Okay.
19
      briefing carefully, and so I'm not going to go over every
20
      single argument that we made in our briefs, but I do want to
21
      reiterate some of the main points.
22
               The main thrust of our motion is that Count 1 of the
23
      indictment in this case rests on new and novel claims that an
24
      ordinary person such as Mr. Letko could not have possibly
25
      known would result in criminal liability.
```

I will note that the Government failed to address most of our arguments head on in their response. Instead they argue that the -- because they laid out the basic elements of these charged offenses, that should be enough to prop up each of these allegations that were challenged in our motion. But simply parroting the elements of the charged offenses should not be a sufficient basis for due process in a case like this that rests on such new and novel claims.

First, we argue that the allegation in paragraph 30 that Mr. Letko and others committed fraud by concealing Mr. Letko's ownership in some of the A1C Pharmacies was not alleged to be material, nor could it be.

And it is interesting to note that in paragraph 32 of the indictment the Government specifically alleged the materiality as to the issue of whether these were retail or mail-order pharmacies, but there was no such specific allegation regarding the materiality of Mr. Letko's ownership in paragraph 30.

That is likely because the mere fact that Mr. Letko may have had some indirect ownership in the A1C Pharmacies could not have been material as a matter of law.

As we laid out in our brief, the any-willing-provider law required the PBMs to allow any qualified pharmacies into their networks.

And under the law the only way the A1C Pharmacies

could have denied a contract -- could have been denied a contract with the PBMs based on Mr. Letko's ownership was if Mr. Letko was an excluded person under the Medicare rules, which he was not.

Simply having the last name of Letko was not a sufficient basis under the law for the PBMs to deny the A1C Pharmacies entry into their systems, and it should not be the basis of a criminal charge in this case.

Second, we challenge the allegation in paragraph 32 regarding whether the A1C Pharmacies properly disclosed to the PBMs the fact that they were mail-order pharmacies as opposed to retail pharmacies.

Mr. Letko could not have possibly or reasonably known that claiming to be a retail pharmacy as opposed to a mail-order pharmacy would result in a criminal charge.

As we laid out in our brief, the Medicare rules and regulations gave only a vague definition of what constituted a retail pharmacy and zero definition of what constituted a mail-order pharmacy.

And moreover, in terms of, you know, a real-world distinction between a mail-order pharmacy and a retail pharmacy is not as simple as you might think. In the real world there are retail pharmacies that mail their prescriptions to their patients. And so that distinction, even in the real world, is not easy to make, let alone under

the Medicare rules and regulations.

And so we believe that it is fundamentally unfair to subject Mr. Letko to criminal liability for failing to distinguish between these two terms that the very Medicare rules and regulations fail to clearly define themselves.

And we do understand that there is case law that says that the knowledge and intent requirements of the fraud statutes cure some of these issues, but frankly, that is — that's cold comfort for someone like Mr. Letko to say to them years later, you know, "Hey, don't worry, you can have a defense at a criminal trial about these issues because we have to prove knowledge and intent," when years ago he is trying to navigate these rules and regulations and figure out whether he is a retail or a mail-order pharmacy.

And as the Supreme Court said in the Kolender case, the underlying principle is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed. And we feel this is exactly what is happening here in the allegation in paragraph 32.

Our third challenge was to the false test claim allegations in paragraphs 33 and 34. And on this point the Government in their response misconstrues -- misconstrues our basic argument. Our argument is not that the allegations about test claims should be dismissed because test claims were

an ordinary and accepted practice in the pharmacy industry. While it is true that they were, test claims are an ordinary and accepted practice in the industry, our argument here is that the allegations must fail because test claims, even if they were somehow false and fraudulent, did not deprive anyone of money or property.

Test claims, as their term suggests, are simply a way for a pharmacy to test whether a prescription might be covered, and if so, how much it might cost. So test claims are not actual claims that are being submitted for reimbursement.

So by their very definition, test claims could not have caused a PBM or plan sponsor or Medicare to actually pay out anything to the A1C Pharmacies. So even if Mr. Letko was involved in submitting a false and fraudulent test claim, that could have not have -- that could not have violated the fraud statutes because the object of submitting a test claim was not to gain money or property.

Our final challenge is to the allegations in paragraphs 35 and 36 regarding refills and transfers without patient consent. Those allegations both rest on the same flawed attempt to criminalize what are essentially violations of civil regulations and guidance documents. There is obviously no criminal statute that says it's a crime to send a refill to a patient or transfer a patient without that

patient's consent.

And so, as we laid out in our brief, there was this complex and constantly changing labyrinth of Medicare rules and regulations and guidance documents that -- some of which contained these prohibitions against sending refills or transferring patients without their consent. But the DOJ's own policy manual warns about this very situation when it states "Criminal and civil enforcement actions by the department must be based on violations of applicable legal requirements and not mere compliance with guidance documents issued by federal agencies."

And the reason why the DOJ has that policy is because it recognizes the fact that mere guidance documents are -- excuse me -- these guidance documents, they're constantly changing. They are not fully vetted by Congress. And they may conflict with other rules and regulations that might be out there.

Moreover, there may be competing policy interests that are at play with the policies that are prescribed in these guidance documents.

For example, there's a competing policy interest in making sure that patients get refills for prescriptions that they need on a regular basis, and so as a result, these allegations which are built -- in paragraphs 35 and 36 -- which are built on civil guidance documents could not have

```
possibly given fair notice to Mr. Letko that he might some day
 2
      be here in a criminal trial having to defend against these,
 3
      you know, alleged violations of civil guidance documents.
 4
               That's all I have, your Honor. And obviously if you
 5
      have any questions, I'm happy to address those.
 6
               THE COURT:
                           Thank you, Mr. Eppel.
 7
               Let's see. Ms. Webster, do you have anything that
 8
      you would like to contribute to this motion argument?
 9
               MS. WEBSTER: No, your Honor. I don't have anything
10
      to add.
               Thank you.
11
               THE COURT: Thank you.
12
               Mr. Burdick.
13
               MR. BURDICK: No, your Honor. He covered everything
14
      and so --
15
               THE COURT: Mr. Burdick, I can't hear you.
16
               MR. BURDICK: No, I don't, your Honor. And I think
17
      that his -- he covered everything in his motion and his reply
18
      brief to the Government's response in opposition. He covered
19
      everything that I would have covered.
20
               THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
21
               MR. BURDICK: I have nothing to add.
22
               THE COURT: Thank you.
23
               Mr. LaRene?
24
               MR. LaRENE: Thank you.
                                        No.
25
               THE COURT: Mr. Berman.
```

MR. BERMAN: No, thank you.

```
2
               THE COURT: Very well. Ms. Dubal.
 3
                          Thank you, your Honor.
               MS. DUBAL:
 4
               Your Honor, as far as this motion is concerned, the
 5
      United States -- the defendant has not raised in his -- in his
 6
      reply brief any additional arguments that were not already
 7
      briefed by the United States in their response, and so I will
 8
      just take a few moments to just quickly summarize some of the
 9
      key points of the United States' response and go from there.
               First and foremost, as it pertains to whether or not,
10
11
      you know, the crime is sufficiently alleged, the United
12
      States' position is that it is. The indictment is drafted
13
      sufficiently. The elements of the offense properly track the
      relevant language of the statute. Defendant is informed of
14
15
      those charges and it allows -- puts him in a position to
      plead, you know, an acquittal of conviction.
16
17
               And the main arguments that the defense makes are
18
      really issues of fact for the jury to decide.
                                                     They are not
19
      legal issues to be decided at this stage in the litigation,
20
      and that would be pretrial.
21
               As far as materiality, materiality is properly
22
      alleged in the indictment in paragraph 25. It's a question
23
      for the jury to decide whether the false assertions in
24
      concealing the true ownership interests in each A1C Pharmacy
25
      would have affected the PBM's decision to contract with the
```

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

```
A1C Pharmacies. And the answer to this question tends to
prove materiality of the scheme and the defendants' intent
in submitting medically unnecessary prescriptions for
Lidocaine as well as --
   (Reporter seeks clarification of the record.)
         MS. DUBAL: -- diabetic testing supplies.
         And I apologize. I will talk slower. I apologize
for that.
         In terms of any vagueness argument that's made, the
vagueness argument that is made with regard to classifying
the pharmacies as mail order versus retail, again, your Honor,
this is -- you know, the Government is required to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants acted knowingly
and willfully to defraud the PBMs as well as Medicare, which
requires the Government to prove that by deceiving the PBMs in
contracting with the pharmacies, concealing their ownership
and misclassifying the pharmacies, that they were actually
able to further the scheme to defraud by distributing these
medically unnecessary medications and diabetic testing
supplies and thereby their -- the submission of the false
claims was knowing and intentional.
```

The defendants are free to argue at trial that mail order -- classification of mail order versus retail was confusing. They are free to argue that at trial during cross examination, and then the jury can decide what weight to give

this evidence as it pertains to the defendants' intent in committing this crime.

And then in terms of the arguments pertaining to test claims and the use of test claims, the use of test claims in this case is not the object of this conspiracy. The object of this conspiracy was to defraud the Medicare program so that the defendants could actually obtain money, which is clearly detailed in the indictment. It was — the use of these test claims is one of the many steps that the defendants took to execute this scheme to defraud, and it's not an issue of law for the Court to decide at this time.

And then lastly, in terms of the defendants' arguments pertaining to auto refills as well as the patient transfer program being civil violations that are not criminal, the United States has followed the Justice Manual guidelines in charging this case as a criminal violation, and the defendants are not being charged with healthcare fraud as a result of the civil -- any type of civil violations.

The auto refill program and the practice of patient transfers is circumstantial evidence of the defendants' intent and proves the materiality of the fraudulent scheme in perpetrating this fraud.

And this was, again, one of the many steps the defendants took to perpetrate this fraud. The weight to give that evidence is for the jury to decide.

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

```
And so, your Honor, for all of those reasons the
defendant -- the United States would ask that you -- that this
Court deny the defendants' motion to dismiss Count 1 of the
conspiracy.
         THE COURT:
                    Thank you, Ms. Dubal.
        Mr. Eppel, any rebuttal?
         You're muted, sir.
         MR. EPPEL: I apologize. Nothing to add, your Honor.
         THE COURT: Very well. And would anybody else like
to be heard? If so, raise your hand.
         And no hands are raised.
         Thank you.
         The motion is presented under Rule 12 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, specifically Rule 12(b)(3)(B)(v),
and the challenge is whether the indictment, that is, Count 1
of the indictment adequately states an offense.
         The indictment, it's well known, states an offense if
it contains the elements of the offense charged; and secondly,
fairly informs the defendant of the charge against which he
must defend; and third, enables him to plead an acquittal of
conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense.
         The indictment in this case charges essentially
conspiracy in Count 1. Let me read the exact label.
"Conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud and wire fraud."
         And the indictment proceeds through paragraphs 24 and
```

following, incorporating paragraphs 1 through 23 to describe the manner and means of the alleged conspiracy.

The defendant makes essentially four arguments that the Government has failed -- or the grand jury has failed to set out a crime under Section 1349 of Title 18 in the various paragraphs in Count 1 of the indictment.

The one principle that perhaps governs the decision in this motion is that courts, when evaluating a motion to dismiss based upon the sufficiency of a charge in the indictment -- in an indictment -- do not evaluate the evidence upon which the indictment is based.

The elements of healthcare fraud are, first -- I'm sorry -- the elements of conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud are, first, an agreement between two or more persons; and secondly, knowingly and willfully to execute or attempt to execute a scheme or artifice to defraud any healthcare benefit program or obtain by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises any of the money or property owned by or under the custody or control of a healthcare benefit program in connection with the delivery of or payment for healthcare benefits, items, or services.

An indictment will usually be sufficient if it states the offense using the words of the statute itself as long as the statute fully and unambiguously states all of the elements of the offense. Here the indictment tracks the statutory

language verbatim, framing both a specific factual background of the alleged fraudulent transactions and the rough date range of the scheme.

Courts have repeatedly held that charges of healthcare fraud conspiracy are adequate when the indictment alleges the time frame of the scheme, identifies the perpetrators of the alleged victims, and charges that the defendants submitted claims for services or items that were medically unnecessary.

The indictment here alleges that the defendants engaged in a scheme between the end of 2013 and the end of 2018 to submit claims to pharmacy benefit managers for refills of medically unnecessary prescription drugs and diabetic testing supplies purportedly for beneficiaries who never asked for them and some of whom were deceased.

The Government also recites numerous other details of the factual background of the scheme, including the defendants' deceptive representations about other circumstances, such as the alleged concealment of Defendant Letko's ownership of -- ownership positions in pharmacies which, had the benefit program known about, would have caused them to decline any dealings with the entities due to his past involvement in other fraudulent conduct.

Those circumstances, whether or not per se unlawful, are relevant to prove the defendants' intent to carry out a

fraudulent scheme, since they evidence a willingness to engage in several forms of misrepresentations and obfuscation in the course of their operations.

But the principle proofs of the criminal fraud charged in the indictment presumably will come from the voluminous records of benefits claims that the Government has produced in discovery, many of which allegedly were for medically unnecessary prescription items.

The evidence of lack of patient consents similarly will be offered to bolster the showing that the items were medically unnecessary, a conclusion that obviously is rendered more credible by evidence that the recipients never asked for the items, and in some cases were persuaded to accept them and not return them only by the improper waiver of co-payments by the defendants.

The lack of any medical necessity also certainly would be supported by proofs that, in some cases, the purported recipients were deceased, and therefore, could have no conceivable medical use for any items delivered by the defendants.

And then, lastly, the defendants' arguments bearing primarily on whether certain specific conduct alluded to in the indictment may comprise legally sufficient proof of fraudulent conduct do not supply any proper ground for pretrial dismissal of a charge that otherwise was adequately

pleaded.

```
2
               So with respect, the Court will deny the motion to
 3
      dismiss Count 1 of the indictment, which is Docket Number 84.
 4
               I see that Mr. McCormack has joined us. In that
 5
      case, we will turn to Defendant Letko's motion to compel
 6
      disclosure of the Brady materials, Docket Number 82.
 7
               And so, Mr. Donnini, I think that is your motion to
 8
      argue; is that correct?
 9
               MR. DONINNI: Yes, your Honor. Thank you.
10
               THE COURT: You may proceed.
11
               MR. DONINNI: Sure.
12
               Before I do, I know that Susan said you were going to
      take a break at 2:30. It's 2:32. Is that no longer an issue?
13
14
               THE COURT: Well, it might be. Can you just stand by
15
      for one second and I can tell you?
16
               MR. DONINNI: Yes, sir.
17
         (Recess taken from 2:32 p.m. to 2:37 p.m.)
18
               THE COURT: Counsel, I'm sorry for the delay.
19
      I appreciate your accommodation.
20
               Mr. Donnini, go ahead on the motion to compel
21
      disclosure of Brady materials, please.
22
               Are you ready to proceed?
23
               MR. DONINNI: Yes, sir. Thank you, your Honor.
24
               THE COURT: Okay.
25
               MR. DONINNI: So, your Honor, this motion essentially
```

asks for two things.

One is disclosure, identifying and disclosing to us

Brady materials within the non-produced material -- and that's

important -- the non-produced items that have not been

produced to the defense.

THE COURT: Okay. What do you characterize as non-produced materials?

MR. DONINNI: So basically that falls into, in my mind, two categories, your Honor. One is the category of documents that have been made available for inspection here in Detroit, as well as in New York and New Jersey, is my understanding. So that's one category. The second category is anything else that the Government has possession, custody, and control over.

And, importantly, I don't define the Government as Ms. Dubal and Mr. McCormack; I define the Government as the Government. And the Government here, not only is there an Eastern District of Michigan investigation, but there was a District of New Jersey investigation, a District of Georgia investigation. And they all seem to be coordinated efforts, because many of those search warrants that were executed across the country happened on the same day, May 4, 2017.

THE COURT: Okay. Let's back up a couple of steps, please, Mr. Donnini.

The items made available in Detroit are made

```
available in Detroit. You don't characterize that as
 1
 2
      non-produced items, do you?
 3
               MR. DONINNI: I do categorize it as non-produced
      because it's -- first of all, I would say that we have -- as
 4
 5
      the Government puts in their response, so far we have received
 6
      and produced to us ten different productions -- I think an
 7
      eleventh came in yesterday -- totaling well in excess of
 8
      2.1 million pages of materials, so we have plenty to sift
 9
      through in the materials that have been produced to us.
      Again, our motion has nothing to do with that.
10
11
               THE COURT: And you're saying there are -- are there
12
      other items in Detroit lodged somewhere here that have not
13
      been turned over to you or made available for you to look at?
               MR. DONINNI: They're made available for us to
14
15
      inspect.
16
               THE COURT: So if they haven't turned it over to you
17
      via some digital production but made it available for you to
18
      look at in Detroit, are you characterizing something like that
19
      as non-produced items?
20
               MR. DONINNI: I am, your Honor.
21
               THE COURT: All right. And so much the more so for
22
      the New York and New Jersey lodged materials?
23
               MR. DONINNI: Yes, your Honor.
24
               THE COURT: All right.
25
               MR. DONINNI: And I don't know how much detail you
```

want me to go into, your Honor, but in terms of the items in Detroit we have boxes of materials and we now know 137 boxes from what was seized at AAMS, All-American Medical Supplies in Miramar, Florida. We have an additional 67 boxes of materials that were seized from AMP, the Warren, Michigan pharmacy here, which is one of the AlC Pharmacies which is the most, I think, prevalent in this, in the indictment. So that's the hard-copy stuff.

But it's not limited to that, your Honor. We have got call center recordings of unknown volume, and we have electronic evidence that I frankly don't have any handle on. Maybe I missed something in the letters and in the response from the Government, but the electronic evidence that is available for inspection, I don't have a handle on what that is and how much that entails.

So as far as I'm concerned, just in Detroit, what's available for inspection is a great volume of materials. And again, that's in addition to the over 2.1 million pages worth of materials that we have that we're working through to the best of our ability. You know, we've had some problems ingesting that. I'm not going to waste the Court's time with that, but that's got to be our first focus. And so we have not made arrangements yet to even go look at this stuff that's available for inspection.

Obviously, the pandemic has added to those

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

```
complications, but even if there weren't a pandemic, we would
focus on what has been given to us first. But all this other
stuff that's just been made available for inspection, our
position is, the Government, if it knows of Brady within
those materials or will become aware of Brady within those
materials, they shouldn't be able to abdicate their
responsibility by simply saying it's available for inspection.
         THE COURT: So do you intend to look at this material
in Detroit?
         MR. DONINNI: Yes, we do, your Honor. We just
haven't gotten to that point yet.
         THE COURT: All right. Continue with your argument.
        MR. DONINNI: Sure.
         So, I mean, largely that covers the -- much of what I
was going to have prepared, and I just think that we're not --
as the Government says in their -- on their response brief,
that we're trying to absolve ourselves of our responsibility
to prepare and that we're trying -- we're asking them to sift
through the evidence to locate anything favorable to the
defense.
         Again, I know I'm repeating myself, but we're not
asking them to do anything with respect to what they have
given us. We know our obligations. We're going through those
materials as best we can. It's the things that are not
immediately available to us even in Detroit. It's close, but
```

we do have some limitations on being able to go see it even

```
2
      now.
 3
               THE COURT: Such as?
 4
               MR. DONINNI: Much the harder to go to New York or
 5
      New Jersey.
 6
               THE COURT: Yeah. Let's just focus on Detroit for a
 7
      minute.
 8
               What are your limitations in being able to go inspect
 9
      those items?
               MR. DONINNI: Well, your Honor, again, I said before
10
11
      and I'll say it again, I think that we wouldn't even be to
12
      that point. While the pandemic has certainly slowed down our
13
      efficiency and our ability to get things done as we would in
      normal terms, but, you know, just getting -- whether it's one
14
15
      or two of us, I have not coordinated logistics.
               Are we going to be in there with another agent? Are
16
17
      we going to be sitting there with masks on all together in a
18
      room? Does the room have windows? I'm assuming it doesn't.
19
      I'm assuming, you know, we're going to be in the basement of a
20
      building somewhere. And, you know, there's just -- is it
21
      going to be one person from our team? Are we going to have
22
      multiple people? These are things we have to think through,
23
      but -- you know, we can get it done, but again, with all
24
      that's going on on that front, we have put that to the side
25
      for now.
```

```
1
               THE COURT:
                           Well, sooner or later I would think to
 2
      prepare you're going to want to spend time with these
 3
      documents and look through them, aren't you?
 4
               MR. DONINNI: Yes, your Honor.
               THE COURT: And so I would suggest that sooner would
 5
 6
      be a better watchword here in terms of making a plan.
 7
      you know, the law is pretty clear that the Government is not
 8
      required to curate this material and give you the good stuff.
 9
               Of course, if something is obviously exculpatory, the
      Government has an obligation to point it out, I suppose. But,
10
11
      you know, sometimes beauty is in the eye of the beholder and
12
      what the Government -- what you might think is exculpatory,
13
      the Government might disagree with. So I think that the cases
14
      are -- point out the dicy nature of an order that requires the
15
      Government to just require -- just turn over material that's
16
      exculpatory, and that obligation can be satisfied by turning
17
      over what the Government has so you can examine it for
18
      yourself.
19
               Certainly they can't withhold anything, but -- and I
20
      understand in a documents case that's heavily ladened like
      this, it's quite burdensome, but that -- the inspection
21
22
      process is really a function of time and resources; right?
23
               MR. DONINNI: Yes, your Honor. And I agree with you,
24
      we need to turn to that again. We have lots to do with what
```

has actually been produced to us, but we do intend to turn to

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

```
those materials that are only available for inspection.
         I guess the only point I would add is, I agree
that -- let's assume the Government is aware of materials that
are -- would fall under Brady within documents that have only
been made available for inspection or not yet made available
for inspection. I don't think their obligation is satisfied
by merely saying, "Here's the treasure trove of materials,"
137 boxes, 67 boxes, 43 boxes, and an unknown number of
electronic documents, and say, "Have at it." I think their
obligation, if they know or become aware, is greater than just
simply making it available for inspection.
         THE COURT: Do you have a case that says that?
         MR. DONINNI: Your Honor, I am more relying on logic
and what I think is appropriate. I do think that the cases
we cited in our brief support that position, but something
specific as to that, no, your Honor.
         THE COURT: Well, people that don't have cases
usually turn to logic.
         MR. DONINNI: Sometimes logic makes sense, and
fairness.
         THE COURT: Well, no, I'm a proponent of logic, but
it's more helpful to make a decision with a case.
         MR. DONINNI: Understood, your Honor.
         THE COURT: All right, Mr. Donnini.
         What's the situation about New Jersey and New York?
```

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

```
MR. DONINNI: Well, again, your Honor, with that,
that is -- those -- it's my understanding those are the
documents that were seized in connection with the, I'll call
it, parallel or coordinated New Jersey investigation. And I
believe -- and the Government will certainly correct me if I'm
wrong -- I believe that investigation is more focused on Jim
Letko's brother and not Mr. Letko in this case specifically;
however, there may be materials within that investigation that
may have important information for us. So again --
         THE COURT: This is the New Jersey compilation?
         MR. DONINNI: Yes, your Honor.
         THE COURT: All right. Are those electronic
documents or paper documents?
         MR. DONINNI: My understanding is, there are 43 boxes
of paper documents, an unknown quantity of electronic
evidence -- and I put that in quotes because that's what
I read in the Government's response -- and then a data
center that hosted e-mails for various entities related to
Mr. Letko's brother.
         THE COURT: The data center is in New York, though;
right?
         MR. DONINNI: The data center is in New York.
electronic evidence, I believe, is in New York. The hard copy
documents are in either Edison or Bridgewater, New Jersey.
         THE COURT: In some agency office?
```

MR. DONINNI: I believe so, your Honor.

```
2
               THE COURT: All right. Anything else, Mr. Donnini?
 3
               MR. DONINNI: Not on that, your Honor. However, I
 4
      would like to make a few comments on the agent notes.
 5
               THE COURT: Oh, yeah. Okay. Go ahead.
 6
               MR. DONINNI: So on this -- and I'll be brief -- the
 7
      Government here has already agreed to preserve the agents'
 8
      rough notes. And they stated in their brief that to the
 9
      extent that they become aware of Brady, exculpatory evidence
10
      within rough notes, it will be produced.
11
               And then another argument they make in their brief is
12
      that it's the Government that gets to decide which information
13
      must be disclosed and the prosecutor's decision on disclosure
14
      is final.
15
               Okay. So putting those, all those together, the
16
      problem with that is that if the Government who has access to
17
      these handwritten notes never looks at them, there is never
18
      going to be anything that's disclosed to us that may be in
19
      those handwritten notes.
20
               So I understand the case law that says if the 302
      exists then there is no violation if the handwritten notes are
21
22
      destroyed, but here we have a situation where the handwritten
23
      notes are being preserved.
24
               And so what we're asking is, we will do the work.
25
      We want to look through the 302s and the handwritten notes,
```

because obviously a witness interview that the Government conducts is not the witness's statement, but the handwritten notes are something that are contemporaneous to the interview.

The 302 is something that the agent creates after the interview itself. And he or she may bring other aspects, other knowledge of the case into that memo-writing process that may very well not be there when they are sitting in the room with the witness. So, in my opinion, the handwritten notes are a better reflection. Again, they are not witness's statements, necessarily, but they are a better reflection of what took place in that room than potentially the 302. And I think that it's -- again, whether we want to call it logical or common sense, that it makes sense for us to be able to see that, to compare it, and to determine for ourselves whether there may be Brady that's within those materials.

And in our reply, between the time of the filing of our motion and the filing of our reply, we did receive the handwritten notes from the interviews of the co-defendants in this case, and we did point out just a couple of instances from Mr. Lazeki's 302 and handwritten notes where we showed one instance where something was added to the 302 which, in our opinion, was more favorable to the Government -- so it wasn't in the notes, but it was in the 302, and it was more favorable to the Government -- and another instance where something was in the notes but excluded from the 302 which was

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

```
actually favorable to the defense.
         So these may not be earth-shattering instances of
discrepancies, but it is an area where we believe we should be
able to see those materials in order to test what happened
when those individuals were interviewed by the Government.
And we believe that the Government should produce those
handwritten notes because they have been preserved, because
they exist, presumably, for all witnesses that the Government
intends to call at trial.
         THE COURT: Okay. Anything else, Mr. Donnini, on
this Docket Number 82?
         MR. DONINNI: No, your Honor. Thank you very much.
         THE COURT: Ms. Webster, anything on this motion?
        MS. WEBSTER: Nothing further. Thank you, your
Honor.
         THE COURT: Mr. Burdick?
         MR. BURDICK: No, sir. Thank you.
         THE COURT: Mr. LaRene?
         You're muted, so I --
        MR. LaRENE: Thank you.
                                 No.
         THE COURT: Thank you.
         And Mr. Berman?
         MR. BERMAN: No, your Honor. Thank you.
         THE COURT: Thank you.
         Mr. McCormack, good afternoon.
```

```
1
               MR. McCORMACK:
                               Thank you, your Honor.
 2
               First I want to apologize to the Court and counsel.
 3
      I'm sorry for the technical issues I experienced logging on.
 4
      Your staff was able to help me get through it. So again, I'm
 5
      sorry, your Honor, for wasting your time earlier today.
 6
               So I would like to just first update the Court, kind
 7
      of clarify the record in terms of what is where with respect
 8
      to the non-produced items, the items that have been made
 9
      available for inspection.
               In Detroit, your Honor, there's 76 boxes from
10
11
      Florida.
                There was an error in the Government's motion citing
12
      137, but it's actually 76 boxes from Florida, 67 boxes that
13
      were seized pursuant to a search warrant in Michigan, and then
      additionally there's -- the electronic evidence solely
14
15
      consists of the telephonic recordings which the Government
16
      obtained from the defendants' VICIbox server. It took some
17
      time, but that was uploaded to a computer at HHS here in --
18
      there in Detroit.
                        I'm sorry, I'm not there, your Honor.
19
               And that server was ultimately returned back to the
20
      defendants, so the defendants have access to the VICIbox
21
      server right now, so they could listen to those recordings
22
      without having to go to the Detroit HHS to review those.
23
               With respect to the --
24
               THE COURT: Who has custody of that?
25
               MR. McCORMACK: Your Honor, I'm not sure who it was
```

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

```
returned to. I know it was returned in June of 2017. I'm not
sure where it stands today amongst the co-defendants or with
the company, your Honor.
         THE COURT: Hmm. Mr. Donnini, are you aware of that?
         MR. DONINNI: Your Honor, I'll have to inquire.
did hear that.
                I don't know if the company has it. You know,
obviously the company is not what it once was, but I will
certainly chase that down, because if I can access the audio
recordings not having to sit at a standalone computer station
at the Government's offices, I intend to do that.
         THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
         Mr. McCormack, how are those audio recordings stored
in the Government's possession?
         MR. McCORMACK: They are stored on a computer, your
Honor. The Government had to subscribe to VICIdial, which is
the software platform that uses VICIbox, and then you can sort
through the recordings by date, by the phone number, even by a
campaign like, for example, "Lidocaine campaign," and one can
sort through the phone calls to find pertinent details, if,
for example, you're looking for a specific phone call with an
identified patient, your Honor. And they are in Detroit HHS
OIG on a standalone computer, your Honor, right now.
         THE COURT: So that database could be replicated and
turned over?
         MR. McCORMACK: It could not, your Honor.
```

requires the software, which I indicated we had to subscribe to. It took us a number of months to even get it into a position where we could access it ourselves. The best we were able to do is have it accessible on the standalone computer at the Detroit HHS office, your Honor.

THE COURT: Standalone computer meaning one that's not connected to the internet?

MR. McCORMACK: It's a computer. The only thing that's on it, my understanding, your Honor, is the VICIdial software with access to the recordings.

THE COURT: Is that software proprietary?

MR. McCORMACK: I believe so, your Honor. Hence, we had to -- we had to subscribe in order to get access. And like I said, it took months to actually upload the phone calls so we were in a position to review them.

THE COURT: All right. So if you returned the raw data to the defendant, the defendant might not even have access to it without subscribing to the proprietary software; is that correct?

MR. McCORMACK: Well, your Honor, they already —
it's our understanding they already subscribed to it in order
to have the platform and to use it on their own, so they could
either resubscribe or maybe they're currently still subscribed
to the software; that, I don't know. But I know at one point
they were subscribing to VICIdial.

```
1
               THE COURT: All right. Go ahead. What else?
 2
                               Thank you, your Honor.
               MR. McCORMACK:
 3
               With respect to New Jersey, there's 43 boxes.
     at the HHS OIG in Edison, New Jersey. The Government is
 4
 5
      currently exploring the possibility of having them transported
 6
      to Detroit on a temporary basis. I was hoping to have an
 7
      answer on that by this hearing today, your Honor, and despite
 8
     my best efforts talking to peopling in New Jersey, I was not
 9
     able to get an update whether that's possible.
               With respect to the data, your Honor, the data --
10
11
               THE COURT: Wait a minute. What do you mean, if it's
12
     possible or not? What would be the problem?
13
               MR. McCORMACK: I just -- I think logistically,
14
     potentially, your Honor -- I mean, we were able to ship
15
     documents from Miami up to Detroit. So as there is a -- that
16
      investigation is ongoing, you know, and they are taking the
17
      lead on it, we just wanted to connect with them to make sure
18
      it's possible that we could do that. And we're still, like I
19
      said, awaiting word to see whether it is possible we could
20
      transport them to Detroit to ease the review for at least
      counsel for four of the five defendants.
21
22
               THE COURT: All right. What else?
23
               MR. McCORMACK:
                              With respect to the data in New York,
24
      your Honor, so there is -- as defense counsel pointed out,
25
      there is data that was seized from e-mails, an e-mail server
```

related to Defendant -- I'm sorry -- Defendant Letko's brother, Jim Letko. That data was, at one point, on a Relativity database in New Jersey.

That Relativity database has been deactivated and the data was taken off a server. The District of New Jersey is in the process of uploading that data to another server in an effort to reactivate the Relativity database. If that occurs, we would be able to produce that to the defendants; however, subject to a filter review would have to happen first, your Honor.

And likewise, the data from Amazon Web Services that was believed to be patient files and records relating to prescriptions from Jim Letko's companies, that information is in New York. And my understanding, it has yet to be accessed by anyone due to technical issues. So they're still in the process of trying to access those materials.

THE COURT: So you're telling me you haven't even been able to look at it; is that correct?

MR. McCORMACK: Correct, your Honor. The Government in this case has not reviewed the New Jersey materials, the hard copy, or the electronic information and -- or the information that was seized pursuant to Mr. Letko's -- John Letko's company that is being housed in New York. That is correct, your Honor, we have not been able to review any of that so far.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. McCORMACK: And likewise, your Honor, the Government's production is not unduly onerous.

As defendant -- as defense counsel indicated in its reply, they tried to distinguish the production here from that in Rorschach (phonetic) by making an argument that Brady requires production as opposed to disclosure, and that is -- there is no case that they have cited that supports that notion. And, in fact, the Sixth Circuit said in Presser that Brady requires disclosure of potentially exculpatory evidence.

And I wanted to draw the Court's attention to two cases that were cited in the Government's pleadings in support of that motion that Brady does not require production. It can also be met through access to disclosure.

And the first is U.S. v. Mmahat, which is spelled M-m-a-h-a-t, for the record. That is cited by both Government and defense, in defense's reply brief. And that was a circumstance, your Honor, in the Fifth Circuit where the Government gave access to half a million documents months before trial to the defense, so did not produce them, merely gave them access, and those records were indexed.

And after -- on appeal, your Honor, defense argued that that was a Brady violation, a failure to identify what was potentially exculpatory. And there the Fifth Circuit said essentially, as your Honor has indicated, there's no authority

for the proposition that the Government's Brady obligations require it to point to specific documents that were turned over.

And the other case, your Honor, is U.S. v. Pellulo, which is P-e-l-l-u-l-o. That's a case out of the Third Circuit, your Honor, where materials were also provided to defense for inspection. In that circumstance the defendant was indicted in Philadelphia, the defendant's principal place of business was in Miami, and the Government provided access to approximately 75,000 pounds of documents in Jacksonville, Florida.

So, your Honor, assuming that a box of evidence is approximately 50 pounds, that's approximately 1,500 boxes of evidence that the defense was given access to. The Government produced a partial index of documents; however, the Government even conceded that that index was obsolete.

However, on appeal, after the defense argued that was in violation of Brady, that production and failure to identify potentially exculpatory evidence, the Court noted that the Government made the documents available to the defendant and without specifying what was helpful to the defense, which is something that Brady does not obligate it to do.

So, your Honor, for those reasons the Government would ask that you would deny the defense request to identify potential Brady materials in what has been made accessible

for review for the defense.

And then briefly, your Honor, with respect to agent notes, it's clear in the Sixth Circuit that rough notes are not discoverable as Jencks material, so that the defense is essentially trying to argue that they are discoverable as potential Brady material. And as is indicated in our pleading, your Honor, to the extent the Government is aware of Brady information in the rough notes it will certainly be produced.

But in support of their argument they cite two examples, your Honor. After the defense filed their motion to compel Brady materials the Government produced approximately 38 pages of rough notes relating to interviews conducted with the three co-defendants that made statements, and of those 38 pages defense cited two examples that they purport identify potential Brady material.

The first is -- the first example with respect to a statement by Mr. Lazeki regarding Jeffrey Roy Kolmer, that -- the report itself does not -- includes more than was indicated in the notes. That's not indicative of an inconsistency, your Honor. The whole purpose of notes during an interview are, they are not verbatim transcripts of what was said, they are merely supposed to help jog an agent's memory when they write their report, and that's certainly what appears to have happened in this circumstance. So the absence of something in

the notes does not reflect an inconsistency.

And furthermore, the second example, your Honor, is equally not persuasive. It is -- essentially defense is trying to characterize that as an omission. So the omission would be that -- an inference that All American Medical was not conducting due diligence with respect to claims; however, the report itself just a couple sentences before the portion that's cited by the defense reads that pharmacists were reviewing prescriptions to make sure that data was reviewed quickly -- correctly, and that on many occasions the data entry team picked the wrong doctors and Emily Lyons caught the mistakes. Certainly it doesn't say that they fixed it, but I think it's implied by those sentences there, your Honor. So that is not -- another example, I think, that does not give light, does not support the defendants' request.

So with respect to the agents' rough notes, your Honor, there is simply no vehicle at this juncture to entitle the defendants to the notes.

And for all those reasons, your Honor, the Government asks that you deny the defendants' motion.

THE COURT: Mr. McCormack, have you read the rough notes?

MR. McCORMACK: I have read the ones that have been produced, your Honor, the defense -- regarding the defendants.

THE COURT: Have you read the other ones?

```
1
               MR. McCORMACK:
                               I have not, your Honor.
 2
               THE COURT: Can you tell me how voluminous that
 3
      collection is?
 4
               MR. McCORMACK: I am not in a position where I can
 5
      answer that, your Honor, with respect to the notes that have
 6
      been preserved.
 7
               THE COURT: You mean you're not in a position because
 8
      you don't know?
 9
               MR. McCORMACK: Yes, your Honor.
10
               THE COURT: All right.
11
               Mr. Donnini, anything further?
12
               MR. DONINNI: Your Honor, I'll stand on our brief and
13
      stand on our argument previously made. But thank you for the
      opportunity.
14
15
               THE COURT: All right. I'm concerned about the
16
      materials in New York and New Jersey being made available.
17
      I'm not going to require the defendants to go there to examine
18
             I will give the Government the option of either
19
      producing the paper materials in New Jersey by transporting
20
      them -- I'm sorry. Let me say this more clearly.
21
               I'll give the Government the option, with respect
22
      to the materials now located in New Jersey, of either
23
      transporting them to Detroit within the next 60 days to allow
24
      the defendants to inspect them or the Government can inspect
25
      them in New Jersey and identify any information that's
```

potentially exculpatory. I presume the Government doesn't want to have the burden of the latter option, and so I'll expect that some arrangements will be made.

The burden is on the defendants, however, to make arrangements to inspect the materials that are in Detroit and made available to it, and however you do that, either with an investigator or a paralegal or with some joint defense agreement to handle it in some more expeditious way, you need to get on that right away.

With respect to the rough notes, they have been preserved. The Government takes the position, it sounds like, that they may be Jencks material. And if that's the case, I'll order them produced consistently with the Jencks Act, and that is, after a witness testifies on direct examination those materials will be produced before cross examination.

That could extend the timing of the trial quite a bit, because I would give the defense an adequate amount of time to review those things, and so perhaps an accommodation can be made sometime closer to the trial date, but I will not order them produced right now.

So to the extent that that relief is a partial grant of the motion, it is so ordered. But in all other respects, the motion is denied.

Let's see. The next one is a motion to strike surplusage. That's Docket Number 83.

And I think, Mr. Donnini, you said you were taking

```
2
      that argument?
 3
               MR. DONINNI: Yes, your Honor. Thank you.
 4
               THE COURT: Okay. You may proceed.
 5
               MR. DONINNI: Okay. Your Honor, again, this is a
 6
      motion under Rule 7(d). And what we have argued in our brief
 7
      is that both the indictment and the seizure affidavits that
 8
      came a couple years prior, we believe it's clear that the
 9
      Government's investigation is about Medicare Part D.
               There are five references to diabetic testing
10
11
      supplies in the indictment, paragraphs 33, 35, 37, 40, and 43.
12
               And again, with Part D, the case is about the A1C
13
      Pharmacies' relationship with private insurers and the PBMs
      that the insurers contract with.
14
15
               The Part B, Medicare Part B is different and that
      covers durable medical equipment and diabetic testing
16
17
      supplies, and that is where it's directly administered by
18
      CMS or the Government, so there is billing directly to
19
      the Government.
20
               In essence, your Honor, we believe that introduction
21
      of allegations of false and fraudulent diabetic testing
22
      supplies, which is a Medicare Part B issue, is going to do
23
      nothing but confuse the jury, waste time, and ought to be
24
      excluded and stricken from this indictment because it has
25
      nothing to do with the claims that were submitted for
```

prescriptions under the Medicare Part D program.

As we -- I think it's important, and I'm going to just go ahead and read a sentence on page 1 of the response, the Government's response, and this is how they lead their argument. They say: "The defendants engaged in a massive multi-pronged healthcare fraud scheme that involved dispensing expensive medications such as Lidocaine and diabetic testing supplies without patient consent resulting in over \$80 million worth of false and fraudulent claims being paid."

Your Honor, the argument that the Government really makes, I think, and obviously they can speak for themselves, is that, you know, there's two things going on, and I think one is they talk about diabetes supplies, and we try to make this point in the response, in the reply that, again, testing, diabetic testing supplies are here in one category and diabetes supplies such as these alcohol pads, that is administered under Part D.

So it's a distinction worth noting and is important because their secondary argument is that the jury needs to hear about diabetic testing supplies under Part B for context and background and how the A1C Pharmacies acquired their patients and filled prescriptions for diabetic patients.

And again, I understand it. The problem is, that's something from our position that's created after the fact.

That is nowhere to be found in the indictment. If you look

at the indictment, those five paragraphs that I articulated, the -- those paragraphs, and I'm looking just at paragraph 33 to start, it says: "Test claims" -- excuse me -- "Caused the submission of false and fraudulent test claims using the physician's MPI for expensive prescription medications and diabetic testing supplies." So -- and that's consistent in 35, and 37, and 40, and 43.

The allegations in the indictment are that false and fraudulent claims for diabetic testing supplies are what's alleged. And what we're saying is that's Part B, that's not Part D. This case is Part D.

And so -- and to be frank, your Honor, you know, I had to learn that, and it took me a while to figure it out, and I do believe that this is something that is unnecessary in this trial, is going to cause confusion, and frankly, ought to be stricken from the indictment because that's what it will accomplish.

You know, the Government -- and then I'll just point out one other thing about the Government's argument. The Government says in their brief that a motion to strike should only be granted when it is clear that the language is both irrelevant and prejudicial. But then on the next page, and they are quoting a case, but on the next page they say a prejudice determination is no part of the Rule 7 analysis, and 403 balancing should be conducted during the trial.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

I mean, in my mind, your Honor, those two really can't coexist, because if a test under Rule 7 -- whether you're going to grant a motion to strike is whether it's irrelevant -- excuse me -- irrelevant and prejudicial, but prejudice is not part of the analysis, then a motion to strike would never be granted upon a pretrial basis, and that can't be correct.

So, again, we believe that there are, again, the -and I -- it's in there, I just think it's important, diabetic testing supplies, examples of that are monitors and testing strips and these lancets. Diabetes supplies, which is in the Counts 2 through 6 of the indictment, alcohol pads, alcohol pads are just supplies that help with the prescription. Okay? So they kind of go hand in hand with the prescription and they are part of Part D, but diabetic testing supplies are a different animal altogether. It introduces a totally separate method of how providers are reimbursed, again, directly from the Government, whereas, Part D has this, I'll call it, more complex structure of a pharmacy who contracts with a PBM, who contracts with a private insurer, who contracts with the Government. And it's just a different animal. We believe that's why references to diabetic testing supplies should be stricken.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Donnini.

Ms. Dubal, are you taking this one or Mr. McCormack?

```
MS. DUBAL:
                          I am, your Honor.
 2
                          All right. You may proceed.
               THE COURT:
 3
              MS. DUBAL: Thank you, your Honor.
 4
               Your Honor, again, you know, the defendant doesn't
 5
      raise any issues, any new issues that weren't already raised
 6
      in their initial motion, so the United States is going to
 7
      primarily rely on its response; however, I will just highlight
 8
      a few points, and I will address -- just actually, your Honor,
 9
      I will address one issue that was raised in the defendants'
10
      reply related to an argument that they made on the U.S. v.
      Buck. That's B-u-c-k.
11
12
               So as is stated in the Government's response, your
13
      Honor, the reference to diabetic testing supplies is relevant
      because it does provide the necessary background to the jury
14
15
      to understand how this whole scheme at A1C Pharmacies work
16
      and how --
               THE COURT: I don't know, Ms. Dubal, if the court
17
18
      reporter is having the same trouble, but it sounds like your
19
      voice is dropping off and it makes it difficult to hear.
20
               MS. DUBAL: Oh.
21
               THE COURT: It could be my --
22
                          I apologize.
               MS. DUBAL:
23
               THE COURT: -- equipment or it could be yours, but
      I'm going to ask you to try to keep your voice up, please.
24
25
               MS. DUBAL: Absolutely, your Honor. Thank you for
```

```
1
      letting me know. I apologize for that.
 2
               Ms. Twedt, are you having any issues -- are you
 3
      having issues with that as well?
         (Discussion held off the record.)
 4
 5
               MS. DUBAL: Okay. Thank you.
 6
               So, your Honor, as I was saying, that the reference
 7
      to diabetic testing supplies is relevant and evidence related
 8
      to -- you know, the diabetic testing supplies would be subject
 9
      to proof at trial, and so under the case law it cannot be
10
      considered as surplusage.
11
               And really, the crux of the issue here for the
12
      defendant is that they are taking issue with the
13
      characterization of diabetic testing supplies, and quite
      frankly, the case law does not support striking language from
14
15
      an indictment or excluding any mention of such a thing on this
      basis. And quite frankly, defendant cites no case law to
16
17
      support this proposition related to the characterization of
18
      diabetic testing supplies.
19
               And so an attempt by the defendants to litigate the
20
      truth of the allegations of the indictment at pretrial, that's
21
      exactly what is happening here.
22
               Now, in the defendants' reply they again argue that
23
      the Government is trying to expand the scope of the alleged
24
      crimes by stating that because the diabetic testing supply
25
      claims by law cannot be submitted for reimbursement under
```

the Medicare Part B program is irrelevant. And again, their issue pertains to the characterization. They're making — they are trying — defendant is trying to make a distinction between diabetic testing supplies and diabetic supplies, alcohol pads, which are used to test for diabetes, and that's a supply that's used to test for diabetes versus diabetic testing supplies. And these are all issues that should be — that can be raised at trial and not an issue for this Court.

The defendant also relies on United States v. Buck, that's B-u-c-k. In citing this case the defendants attempt to argue that reference to diabetic testing supplies will inflame the jury into believing that the defendants committed more crimes than was actually charged in the indictment; however, unlike Buck, there is no inflammatory language in the indictment with regard to reference to diabetic testing supplies.

"Diabetic testing supplies" is an innocuous term to describe supplies that are used when testing insulin levels for diabetes. There is no risk that the jury will convict any of the defendants for committing crimes under the Part B program, since that's not what's alleged. That's not what the defendants are charged with. And as the defendants themselves acknowledge, there is no reference to the prepping program in the indictment.

In addition, the Government does not intend on

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

anything to add?

introducing evidence that the defendant did commit any crimes under the Medicare Part B program, and mere reference to diabetic testing supplies in the indictment will not automatically inflame the jury into believing that they have committed more crimes than what is actually alleged. In Count 1, a reference to -- reference is made to diabetic testing supplies to provide context and background as it relates to how the conspiracy was executed. And as to Counts 2 through 6 which incorporates language from Count 1 by reference, Defendant Lazeki is actually charged with submitting claims for diabetic testing supplies. Reference to diabetic testing supplies is relevant to the Government's case-in-chief and would be subject to proof at trial. And so for all those reasons, your Honor, the United States would respectfully request that this Court deny the defendants' motion. THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Dubal. Mr. Donnini, before I ask for any rebuttal, I neglected to ask any other of the attorneys for the defendants if they wished to weigh in on this motion to strike surplusage. So let me just run down that so I can make that inquiry for the record. Ms. Webster, on behalf of Mr. King, do you have

```
1
               MS. WEBSTER: I don't. Thank you, your Honor.
 2
               THE COURT: Thank you.
 3
               And Mr. Burdick?
 4
               MR. BURDICK: No, sir.
 5
               THE COURT: And Mr. LaRene?
 6
               MR. LaRENE: Thank you.
 7
               THE COURT: Thank you.
 8
               And finally, Mr. Berman?
 9
               MR. BERMAN: No, your Honor. Thank you.
10
               THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
11
               Mr. Donnini, any rebuttal?
12
               MR. DONINNI: Yeah. Briefly, your Honor.
13
               So, again, Ms. Dubal said that essentially that's not
14
      what's alleged, that reimbursement under Part B is not what's
15
      alleged. And my problem with that is that diabetic testing
      supplies are reimbursable under Part B, and there are five
16
17
      instances in the indictment which say "false and fraudulent
18
      claims for diabetic testing supplies." So if this case is not
19
      about Part B, I'm not sure how I reconcile that, and that's
20
      my -- that's my difficulty here.
21
               I don't want to steal Mr. Berman's thunder here in
22
      his motion for a bill of particulars, but the sentence that
23
      I read earlier on page 1 of the Government's response where
24
      it says, you know, "a massive multi-pronged healthcare fraud
25
      scheme where" -- "involving dispensing expensive medications
```

such as Lidocaine and diabetic testing supplies resulting in over \$80 million worth of false and fraudulent claims," again, I'll only mention it because I know he is going to handle this, but we don't know what claims.

So not only do we not know what Lidocaine claims, but we don't know what portion of that might involve diabetic testing supplies that are reimbursable under Part B. So I think that that's a lead-in to the motion for a bill of particulars, but we're left kind of scratching our heads with, what claims are we defending? And if this isn't about claims for diabetic testing supplies under Part B, my read of the indictment is, that's what the indictment says. It doesn't say that diabetic testing supplies are -- are for background and for how they acquired patients, et cetera.

Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. The motion to strike surplusage is one that is authorized under Rule 7(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; however, I think everybody acknowledges that these motions are rarely granted. They are appropriately granted, however, when the language in the indictment is information that is plainly irrelevant and prejudicial -- a prejudicial assessment or an assessment of prejudice, better stated, is pertinent and not impertinent to the consideration of such a motion.

But that having been said leads to the rhetorical

question of how an item which might be a legal non sequitur included in an indictment can be prejudicial.

It's not my practice to read the indictment to the jury. I summarize it and don't permit anybody else to read it to the jury. And certainly the indictment is not submitted to the jury as evidence, because the indictment is not evidence in the case.

The question, then, is whether or not the information that's recited in the indictment is irrelevant and ought to be excluded at trial, which really is an evidentiary question, and it's one that's properly or more properly assessed in the context of the proofs as they are presented.

This motion here does not present the rare exception that the information alleged to be surplusage should be stricken. And the Government, I think, credibly asserts that the defendants' attempt to characterize some items they supplied as diabetic testing supplies not covered by Medicare Part D poses a factual issue that is subject to proof and argument at trial.

The Government has explained in its response that it intends to prove that the defendants' scheme included, as a component, the conversion of patients from coverage under Part B to Part D, which is relevant to help the jury understand the background, means and ends of the criminal conspiracy.

Regardless of the particular regulations under which the specific dispensations might have been regulated, information that's offered to complete the context or background of a conspiracy is relevant, and consequently, properly chargeable in an indictment even if it concerns nominally unregulated or lawful acts which are offered to explain the overall context of the conspiracy scheme itself.

The preamble of the indictment refers to Medicare
Part D in sections describing the overall background of the
criminal scheme, but the charging sections are unspecific and
the allegations of healthcare and wire fraud are not expressly
premised on the violation of any particular regulation, but
instead anchored by the more general allegation that the
defendant submitted numerous claims for medically unnecessary
items and services, alleging in an exemplary fashion that
those items include such things as prescription drugs,
diabetic testing supplies, which are neither needed nor
requested by the purported recipients.

So despite the defendants' position that the case is only about Medicare Part D, the indictment itself betrays no express limitation in that regard in the charges, in the charging of the scheme to defraud.

So with respect, the motion to strike surplusage is denied.

Going on, then, to the motion for bill of

particulars, Mr. Berman, I think Mr. Donnini did his best to tee that one up for you, so you may proceed.

MR. BERMAN: Thank you, your Honor. And it is always very helpful to follow Mr. Donnini.

The motion I filed for a bill of particulars has been touched on by the argument the Court has heard so far today, the importance of the motion for the bill of particulars.

It's been extensively briefed in my brief and the Government's brief, and I don't mean to take up too much of the Court's time by repeating arguments that it seems clear the Court is familiar with.

But I would say just generally, we have asked for the Court to order the Government to provide us with two types of particulars. One, the identity of other conspirators, co-conspirators; and also, particulars relating to the specific false -- allegedly false claims for payment that the Government alleges were submitted.

To take it in that order, the identities -- the identity of co-conspirators is important for one -- for a very specific reason, which is, the Government has provided us with statements made by a large number of witnesses that were interviewed during the Government's investigation, and it seems likely that some of those witnesses would, in fact, be called as defense witnesses.

The uncertainty of not knowing who the Government

considers to be a co-conspirator will pose a challenge to -I suspect, based on experience -- persuading some of those
witnesses to appear as defense witnesses if they wanted to.
So with respect to that motion for a bill of particulars, it
is a very, very specific purpose why, in this case as opposed
to perhaps others, it is appropriate for the Court to order
the Government to provide us with the names of those
co-conspirators.

With respect to the request for a bill of particulars identifying the specific claims for payment, though, as I have said in my brief, the Government's indictment does provide notice of the offense that the defendants are charged with, I have no idea whatsoever which claims for payment the Government considers both my client specifically to have participated in in submitting to the Government and defendants more generally.

I say -- and let me do them in the reverse order.

It's impossible to create -- to prepare a defense to an allegation that false claims were submitted without knowing what those false claims are. It's particularly hard for my client because, as I touched on in my brief, my client isn't even alleged in all the paragraphs of the indictment of having been involved in submitting false claims.

So just for example, and I won't go through the entire argument, but paragraph 34 of the indictment alleges

that three of the defendants submitted false claims for test claims without the Medicare beneficiary's consent. My client is not included in that allegation.

Paragraph 33 alleges that false and fraudulent test claims were submitted without the physician's consent. My client is not included in that allegation.

I have no way of knowing which claims I'm going to have to attack or challenge or grapple with at trial based on the Government's indictment. And unless the Government is alleging that every single claim ever submitted by the company was fraudulent, which I don't understand the Government's allegations to be, and that's not what they have argued in their response, then it is only fair that the defendants be put on notice as to which claims they have to defend against.

This is not a case and it's not the sort of crime where there is a reasonable number of transactions that defendants' review in discovery could just perhaps discern on their own which ones were unlawful. This is a case involving tens of thousands -- my estimate, I don't know the exact number -- of claims, and not only are there claims, but as the Court has heard, those claims for payment are -- given the Government's theory of the case, are related to telephone calls that were made to specific patients in attempts to obtain consent which the Government alleges wasn't obtained.

So unless these -- the specific claims that the

Government asserts were false are identified, I personally and the defendants in general have -- are put in a position where they have to listen to all of those recordings in an attempt to try to guess which ones the Government is insisting was unlawful.

So I have, to some extent, repeated what I have already written in our briefs, but for those reasons and the ones I have stated in writing, we would submit that it's appropriate in this particular case for the Court to order the Government to provide the defendants with the clarity they need to prepare a defense to the allegations in the indictment.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Berman.

Does anyone else wish to be heard on that from the defense side? Raise your hand if you do.

Mr. Donnini.

MR. DONINNI: Your Honor, thank you.

I don't mean to be a broken record, but just going back to what I said on the last argument, I agree with Mr. Berman that I don't believe -- and we're going to hear from them shortly -- that the Government is claiming that every single claim is false and fraudulent; however, I did point out that they spoke about Lidocaine and diabetic testing supply claims that totaled \$80 million of false and fraudulent claims.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

```
So we are left in this position of scratching our
head wondering, is it all Lidocaine claims? Is it Lidocaine
claims and DTS claims? Is it $80 million? Is $80 million the
universe of claims over the five-year period?
         And what Mr. Berman points out, there are recordings
after recordings after recordings, and to not be able to hone
in on the specific claims that the Government alleges to be
fraudulent, we're put to a herculean effort of trying to guess
what those may be.
         THE COURT:
                    Thank you. Anyone else?
         I see no one else asking to be heard.
        Mr. McCormack, I take it it's your response on this
one?
         MR. McCORMACK: Yes.
                               Thank you, your Honor.
         Your Honor, I just want to respond to some of the
points that were recently raised in the reply and that were
raised today in court, and I'll rest on my pleadings for the
vast majority of the Government's position, your Honor.
         THE COURT: You mean your briefs?
         MR. McCORMACK: Yes. In the Government's briefs,
your Honor.
         Essentially, the Government's indictment is not
       As the Court had already articulated today with
respect to issuing its ruling on the motion to dismiss, the
indictments track the statutory language and provides details,
```

factual details of the fraudulent schemes alleged, and the manner and means in terms of how these co-defendants committed this conspiracy, your Honor.

The issue of referring to unnamed co-conspirators as well as not identifying the specific false claims of the indictment does not mean that the indictment is vague.

Defense has not produced a case from the Sixth Circuit where a defendant charged with a conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud was granted a bill of particulars with respect to their requests to identify false claims or unnamed co-conspirators, as they do here, your Honor.

In their reply, they attempt to distinguish this case from Elhorr by arguing that the substantive counts in Elhorr provide information like the beneficiary's name, information regarding the transactions. That's exactly what this indictment includes, your Honor, with respect to Counts 4, 5, and 6. The -- I'm sorry -- 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, the substantive counts, your Honor.

This case is no different than Elhorr. In Elhorr the only issue was Count 1 with respect to the bill of particulars, the conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud. There were multiple defendants seeking to identify false claims and the identity of unnamed co-conspirators, and there the Court denied that request noting that those are not proper subjects for a bill of particulars. And that's exactly --

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

```
THE COURT: Under the claims identified in Counts 2
through 6 of the indictment, do you intend to prove that any
other claims submitted were false?
         MR. McCORMACK: Yes, your Honor.
         THE COURT: Which ones?
         MR. McCORMACK: Well, there's a number of claims,
your Honor.
         THE COURT: And which ones?
         MR. McCORMACK: You know, I can't -- I can't identify
each false claim right now, your Honor. I can speak to the
universe of false claims.
         THE COURT: Can you tell me how many?
         MR. McCORMACK: I cannot tell you the exact number of
how many false claims were alleged to have been submitted that
were fraudulent and false, your Honor.
         THE COURT: Can you give me an approximation?
         MR. McCORMACK: I cannot. What I can -- what I can
tell you with respect to the discovery, your Honor, the
defense relies on McQuarrie for a circumstance where an
overproduction of discovery would necessitate a bill of
particulars, and that is not the circumstance that we're in
here, your Honor.
         THE COURT: Yes, but I would like you to stick with
my question for a minute.
         You are intending to offer evidence at trial, I
```

presume, that a number of claims of undetermined amount are false. How do you intend to prove that, by just showing the paperwork for each of the claims?

MR. McCORMACK: We would put in testimony, your

Honor. For example, one of the allegations is that the claims

were submitted with respect to a doctor's MPI number who was

used to submit test claims. Within the discovery production,

the first discovery production, there is a folder labeled

"Medicare Data."

Within that folder there is a subfolder labeled "Medic Data" and that -- through interview reports, that doctor is identified as Dr. Peter Garretts.

Within that subfolder there is a file called "Garretts Part D." That Excel spreadsheet demonstrates all the false claims that were submitted by the co-defendants in this case with respect to that allegation.

Additionally, your Honor, with respect to the allegation that Attorney Berman is not aware of any false claims regarding Ms. Peterson, at the bottom of -- I'm sorry -- at paragraph 35 of the indictment, it alleges that the Ms. Peterson conspired with her co-defendants to submit claims for medically unnecessary prescription refills, including dead beneficiaries.

Within the discovery production, your Honor, the first discovery production, in that same folder, the "Medicare

```
Data" folder, there is a subfolder "Medic Data."
 1
 2
               Within that folder there is another folder labeled
 3
      "Bene Sharing."
               And in that there is a file called "After Death PDE
 4
 5
      Records." And that Excel spreadsheet is a list of claims that
 6
      were submitted for beneficiaries after their death.
 7
               THE COURT: Mr. McCormack, is the discovery that
 8
      you're referencing indexed in any way?
 9
               MR. McCORMACK: Well, yes, your Honor. Every
      production comes with a letter indicating what the discovery
10
11
      is in terms of its Bates number and its source. And then
12
      within the production itself, your Honor, the data and
13
      actually all the discovery is within subfolders identified by
14
      the type of discovery or the source of discovery.
15
               And then within those subfolders you can whittle it
      down to exactly what you're looking for; for example, an Excel
16
17
      spreadsheet of all the false claims relating to dead
18
      beneficiaries or all the false claims relating to Dr. Peter
      Garretts' Part D submission. They are all labeled.
19
20
               The Government has --
21
               THE COURT: So if you were going to, say, prepare for
22
      trial yourself, you would be able to identify the source or at
23
      least the location of the information for the false claims
24
      that you would intend to offer as evidence in trial by Bates
25
      number, I quess?
```

```
1
               MR. McCORMACK: Yes.
 2
               THE COURT: Or folder?
 3
               MR. McCORMACK: Yes, your Honor, within the folders.
 4
      Like, for example, an allegation that medically unnecessary --
 5
      I'm sorry -- that prescriptions were transferred from
 6
      Defendant Letko's pharmacies to his brother's pharmacies
 7
      without patient consent, there is a shared beneficiary
 8
      analysis within the data production which demonstrates shared
 9
      beneficiaries between both companies which helps identify
      which universe of patients had their prescriptions transferred
10
11
      from one entity to the other.
12
               So with respect to that, your Honor, and those types
13
      of Excel spreadsheets, they can be filtered, your Honor, by
      information such as the date of services, the name of the
14
15
      pharmacy, et cetera. So these -- you know, these are active
      Excel spreadsheets that can be filtered and pivot tables can
16
      be created to help maximize the utility of that data.
17
18
               THE COURT: And this has been turned over already?
19
               MR. McCORMACK: Yes, your Honor. The vast majority
20
      of the data was produced within the first production, I
      believe in October of 2019.
21
22
               There's approximately 28 Excel spreadsheets that were
      produced with respect to data. There's -- additionally,
23
24
      there's PDF copies of analysis that was conducted by Medicare
25
      contractors such as Quarland (phonetic) which identify the
```

number of -- the total universe of payments that each particular pharmacy received with respect to Medicare Part D. So it's possible to look at those PDF files and then figure out the total universe of payments to those entities.

And lastly, your Honor, this notion that with respect to a bill of particulars that the defendants are not evident of the -- aware of the allegations against them, in addition to the proper settings which are cited in our pleadings, I believe, your Honor, it's evident from these pleadings as well as the arguments you heard today that the defendants appreciate and understand the allegations against them with respect to Medicare and the -- at least in general, the false claims.

So, your Honor, for all those reasons the Government would ask that you deny the defendants' request for a bill of particulars.

THE COURT: Does the Government intend to call as witnesses at trial any individuals whom you would characterize as an unindicted co-conspirator?

MR. McCORMACK: You know, your Honor, that's a good question. I think there's a number of people that -- you know, this was a large corporation and, you know, at this -- at this juncture, I'm not sure I could effectively answer that question. So I --

THE COURT: Well, let me ask it a slightly different

```
1
      way.
 2
               Do you -- are you aware of any unindicted
 3
      co-conspirators that you would not be intending to call as
 4
      witnesses at trial?
 5
               MR. McCORMACK: You know, your Honor, there was a lot
 6
      of people involved in the submission of these claims. You
 7
      know, a lot of people blessed some of the practices that were
 8
      going on. But at this point right now I am not aware of
 9
      calling any unindicted co-conspirators at this time, your
10
      Honor.
11
               THE COURT: All right. Mr. McCormack, any further
12
      argument?
13
               MR. McCORMACK: No, thank you, your Honor.
14
               THE COURT: Thank you.
15
              Mr. Berman, any follow-up?
16
               MR. BERMAN: No, your Honor. Thank you.
               THE COURT: All right. The bill of particulars
17
18
      motions are authorized, that is, a bill of particulars is
      authorized under Rule 7(f) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
19
20
      Procedure, and it is meant to be used as a tool to minimize
21
      surprise and assist the defendants in obtaining information
22
      needed to prepare a defense and also to preclude a second
23
      prosecution for the same crimes.
24
               I don't think the double jeopardy concern is foremost
25
      in the defendants' motion and the joinders, but rather, trial
```

preparation, I think, is really the main reason why the defense has brought this motion.

The cases also tend to look to discovery as an alternative method of providing information to the defendants for trial preparation, and Mr. McCormack has identified a means of determining what false claims the Government intends to offer at trial and so that the defendant can -- defendants can be prepared to address those as they come up.

Mr. McCormack tells me right now, and certainly credibly, that he is not able to identify with particularity specific claims that he intends to offer at trial that allegedly were false when submitted, but he has identified the method of locating those materials within the discovery.

And so I'm going to direct the Government to identify the folders and subfolders that have been discussed here on the record or any other ones that fall within those categories to the defendants at this time, that is, to identify them to the defendants so that they know where to look within the discovery materials for the evidence that would constitute false claims or at least the universe of false claims from which the Government might select evidence to offer at trial.

And I will deny the motion for a bill of particulars without prejudice and permit the defendants to renew that motion after they have taken a look at the information furnished by the Government so that they can look at the

```
discovery materials, and if there is additional confusion or
 1
 2
      some vagaries with respect to what the evidence might be and
 3
      what claims they must defend against, we can approach it at
      that time.
 4
 5
               So the motion is denied without prejudice.
 6
      Government is directed to produce the materials I have
 7
      identified, and I guess it's really locator materials,
 8
      because the materials themselves have been produced already.
 9
               And I'll set a deadline of the 24th, that's two
      weeks, for the Government to furnish that to the defendants.
10
11
               The motion otherwise is denied.
12
               Finally, we have Defendant King's motion to sever.
      That's Docket Number 90.
13
14
               Ms. Webster, I think that's your motion; is that
15
      correct?
16
               MS. WEBSTER: It is, your Honor. Thank you.
17
               THE COURT: All right. You may proceed.
18
                             Thank you, your Honor. I know that the
               MS. WEBSTER:
19
      Court has --
20
               THE COURT: Before you do, could I ask you to just
21
      stand by for one second?
22
               MS. WEBSTER: Sure.
23
               THE COURT: All right.
24
         (Pause in the proceedings at 3:47 p.m.)
25
               THE COURT: Thank you. I wanted to -- I wanted to
```

print the Government's response to the motion, because I find it easier to navigate this one with a paper copy rather than the online copies.

But in any event, go ahead, Ms. Webster.

MS. WEBSTER: Thank you, your Honor.

Your Honor, I know the Court has read the motion, so I just have a few you points that I want to highlight.

The Government essentially is conceding that there is a Bruton issue in this case, which is based on Mr. Lazeki's not one statement, not two statements, but four statements that have been submitted or given to law enforcement.

And so, your Honor, we are hanging our hat on United States versus Flowers. The Government does not distinguish that case in its response. And I think that case is the more appropriate case to follow on these facts.

I would also note, your Honor, that the Government is stating that if we open the door with respect to, I guess, Mr. Lazeki's statements that it would be willing to redact names and use neutral terms or just outright remove my client's name. And I think that's very problematic when you look at the big picture.

So imagining jurors looking at documents that are redacted in multiple places, I think that naturally, naturally would lead to the jury trying to figure out who it is that is being referred to. And I don't think that that is a realistic

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

```
option and that Mr. King should be severed, your Honor.
         I also, your Honor, would state that this case, as
you have heard, has a lot of discovery. In a five-defendant
case it's not clear who the Government thinks played bigger
roles or smaller roles in terms of how they lay out their
indictment. And so I think that that presents this case as
one that's fraught with opportunity to prejudice Mr. King.
         We have antagonistic defenses, as you can see here,
as we have said with respect to Mr. Lazeki, at least, pointing
the finger at my client, and I think that that is going to
be problematic.
        And I know it's difficult to win on an antagonistic
issue. I know those aren't granted very often, your Honor,
but I think if ever there was a case, that this is a case that
presents itself to sever Mr. King.
         And so, your Honor, for those reasons, I am asking
the Court to sever us from this case.
         THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Webster.
         Does anyone else wish to -- anyone else on the
defense side wish to address this motion? Let me just go
through the list.
         Mr. Donnini?
         Mr. Donnini is shaking his head. I take that as a
"no."
         MR. DONNINI: No. Thank you, your Honor.
```

```
THE COURT: Mr. Burdick?
 1
 2
               MR. BURDICK: No, sir.
 3
               THE COURT: Thank you.
               And Mr. LaRene?
 4
 5
               MR. LaRENE: No.
                                 Thank you, sir.
 6
               THE COURT: Mr. Berman.
 7
               MR. BERMAN: No, your Honor.
 8
               THE COURT:
                          Thank you.
 9
               MR. BURDICK: I think Mr. Eppel had raised his hand,
10
      your Honor.
11
               THE COURT:
                          I'm sorry?
12
               MR. EPPEL: Your Honor, I apologize.
                                                      This is
13
      Mr. Eppel on behalf of Mr. Letko.
14
               THE COURT: Yes. I asked Mr. Donnini and we only
15
      have one at a time.
16
               Do you want to address this, though, really?
17
               MR. EPPEL: There were a couple small points I wanted
18
      to make, your Honor.
19
               THE COURT:
                          Well, okay. Go ahead. Make your points.
20
               MR. EPPEL: The proposed redactions that the
21
      Government has laid out, I think, are problematic in three
22
      particular instances. And I'm happy to go through those, if
23
      you like, your Honor.
24
               The first one is on page 12, and it's the second
25
      bullet point regarding patient transfers.
```

```
Page 12 of what?
 1
               THE COURT:
 2
                          I'm sorry. This is of the Government's
               MR. EPPEL:
 3
      response. So this is the Government's response which lays out
 4
      the proposed redactions to the statements.
 5
                          So this is page 12 of the brief itself?
               THE COURT:
 6
               MR. EPPEL:
                          Correct.
 7
               THE COURT:
                          Okay. I've got it.
 8
               MR. EPPEL: And so the second bullet point down
 9
      regarding patient transfers, they propose redacting it to say
      that "Lazeki brought up his concerns to others and Lazeki was
10
11
      instructed to continue to fill prescriptions."
12
               I think the problem there is, your Honor, the only
13
      people that could have instructed Mr. Lazeki would be Mr. King
      or Mr. Letko. So I don't know that that proposed redaction
14
15
      cures the issue.
16
               The second one, your Honor, that I'll point to is on
17
      the next page, page 13, and it's the first bullet point, where
18
      they propose redacting it to say that "Lazeki denied that AAMP
19
      submits a claim in order to hold the patient until the refill
20
      prescription is ready to be dispensed, although it may have
      been happening at one of the other pharmacies."
21
22
               That proposed redaction is actually worse for us,
23
      your Honor, because the original statement is that it was
24
      "happening at one of the other pharmacies owned by the Letko
25
      brothers." That's not who is on trial here.
```

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

And if it's changed to just say "at one of the other pharmacies," the jury may conclude that they are talking about other A1C Pharmacies which are at issue in this trial, and which are, you know, pharmacies that Jim Letko himself had interest in as opposed to pharmacies that were owned by his brothers, which are not at issue in this trial. And the same issue occurs in -- further down on page 13. It is the -- I guess, the third main bullet point regarding post-interview information. They propose changing it from "They just rotated the patients to one of the other Letko brothers' owned pharmacies" to "They just rotated the patients to one of the other pharmacies." Again, the implication there may be the jury could think we're talking about other A1C Pharmacies that Mr. Jim Letko had an interest in as opposed to pharmacies his brother might have had an interest in. That to me seems worse for Mr. Letko if it's brought in that way. And so I just wanted to bring the Court's attention to those three particular redactions that are proposed by the Government.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Eppel.

I don't see anyone else that wishes to be heard.

And so is this yours, Ms. Dubal or Mr. McCormack?

James Letko, et al. - 19-20652

MS. DUBAL: It's mine, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Go ahead, if you

wish.

2 MS. DUBAL: Thank you so much.

So, your Honor, I'll keep my argument brief and really just focus on the defendant's reply. The first point being that the defendant has stated that the Government does not address Flowers. From the Government's vantage point, they focus on four statements, and Mr. Eppel has added one additional statement that isn't covered by the reply which I can address that.

In terms of the first statement that is referenced, and that's in Exhibit A at 4, and that is -- excuse me. Just one moment, your Honor.

That is the statement with regard to -- I just need one moment, your Honor.

That is the statement that -- in the defendant's reply brief that states that Lazeki brought up his concerns to Jim and -- Jim and King.

Your Honor, the Government's position is that this comports with the case law that is cited in the Government's brief and is more in line with Vasilakos than it is with Flowers. I'm not sure if I'm pronouncing that correctly, but I will spell it. It's V-a-s-i-l-a-k-o-s.

The Government's position is that Flowers is distinguishable because in that case the Sixth Circuit analyzed the issue after trial. And the Sixth Circuit was

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

```
really focused on the fact that evidence was presented
immediately prior to the admission of defendant's statements,
effectively -- of the defendant's statement, effectively
negated the cured Brutonized statement.
         Since we're in a pretrial stage right now that issue
doesn't exist here and the Government does not intend on
making that same mistake in its case-in-chief.
         Now, your Honor, with that being said, if the Court
is inclined to grant this motion based at all on this
statement alone, the U.S. proposes to redact the entirety
of the statement from Mr. Lazeki's -- from that --
         THE COURT: When you say "redact the entirety of the
statement," that means not offer it in evidence; right?
         MS. DUBAL: That's right, your Honor. That's right.
         THE COURT: Do you intend to offer any of these
statements in your case-in-chief?
         MS. DUBAL: Your Honor, you know, I think that --
yes, we do intend on offering the statement, Mr. Lazeki's
statement in our case-in-chief. I think the -- I think at a
trial phase, depending on how the evidence is presented, you
know, I think that I have been in circumstances where we will
present a defendant's statement and parts of it are redacted
after speaking with defense counsel, depending on how the
evidence has played out, and that's obviously something that
```

the Government is willing to do. But at -- but yes, we do

anticipate, at this stage, introducing some of these statements into evidence.

And when you say -- and just to clarify, your Honor, and I should have done this before, the United States intends on introducing Mr. Lazeki's statement subject to the redactions that are proposed here in this -- in our response.

The next statement that -- in the defendant's reply brief that is addressed at Exhibit A at 3 that involves Letko instructing Lazeki to dispense supplies as a part of the Lidocaine campaign.

Your Honor, the Government has properly cured that statement by removing any mention or obvious implication of the defendants. Since the Government has properly cured the statement, the defendants are now taking issue with the term, "Lidocaine campaign" and stating that it implicitly refers to others because of the way a campaign is inherently run.

The term "Lidocaine" does not implicate Bruton because this term does not facially incriminate the other defendants, and therefore, does not violate the confrontation clause. This is simply defendant's attempt to sort of strip the co -- Mr. Lazeki's statement by creating and calling this a Bruton issue.

Now, as far as Exhibit A at 4, and this is what Mr. Eppel referenced with regard to modifying the language of the two statements that refer to the Letko brothers'

pharmacies, the Government's position is that Flowers is not implicated with regard to the Government's proposed edits to this statement. These statements arguably don't implicate Bruton, since had the report been written such that each individual pharmacy was named or if the pharmacies were referred to as the A1C Pharmacies or the Global Pharmacies — and for your Honor's reference, the Global Pharmacies are Mr. Letko's brother, John Letko's, that's the name of his organization, the Global Pharmacies — this would not be a valid Bruton claim.

And under the defendant's argument there is no reference to -- if we were to adopt the defendant's argument as to this statement, there is no reference to any of the specific A1C Pharmacies that would be admissible through the Lazeki statements, not even All American Medical Pharmacy, which is AAMP, which is the pharmacy that Lazeki worked at.

This is a conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud, as your Honor is well aware, and it is specifically alleged in the indictment that patient transfers were taking placing amongst the A1C and Global Pharmacies whenever the A1C Pharmacies lost the PBM contract, and mere references to those pharmacies in a defendant's statement does not necessarily trigger Bruton.

However, with that being said, in an abundance of caution, the Government did propose to cure these statements

```
to remove any mention or obvious implication of Mr. Letko.
 2
      Referring to the A1C Pharmacies as "other pharmacies" instead
 3
      of "the Letko pharmacies" does exactly what Bruton is
 4
      concerned with, which is that the jury would place all the
 5
      blame on Letko by virtue of Mr. Lazeki's statement referencing
 6
      the A1C Pharmacies and Letko-owned or Letko brothers'
 7
      pharmacies.
 8
               The Government's position is that the redaction
 9
      properly cures any potential Bruton issue for the defendants.
10
               And again, your Honor, if your Honor is inclined to
11
      grant this motion based on these two statements, the United
12
      States would propose to redact the entirety of the statement
13
      in question to remove any reference at all to even Mr. Letko
14
      and Mr. King.
15
               THE COURT: All right. You do concede, Ms. Dubal,
16
      that these -- none of these statements are admissible against
17
      any of the defendants except Mr. Lazeki; correct?
18
               MS. DUBAL: Yes, your Honor.
19
               THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Any further
20
      argument?
21
               MS. DUBAL: I do not. Thank you, your Honor.
22
                          Thank you.
               THE COURT:
23
               Ms. Webster, anything else?
24
               MS. WEBSTER: No, your Honor. I don't have anything
25
      further.
```

THE COURT: All right. The joinder rule is Rule 8 and it permits the Government to join offenses of a similar character or based on the same act or transaction and join defendants on the same basis.

Rule 14 authorizes severance. Severance is authorized if it appears that consolidation will prejudice the defendant. Prejudice arises when there is serious risk that a joint trial would compromise specific trial rights of one of the defendants or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.

The defendant presents two bases for severance. One is the Bruton problem. The other is the antagonistic defense problem. The second one is much easier to deal with, in my view.

Antagonistic defenses only pose a problem when one person's claim of innocence is predicated solely on the guilt of a co-defendant. There is no such claim here, and the defendant merely argues that they may attempt to foist -- that there is no suggestion that they may attempt to foist blame on co-defendants or argue that they were less culpable.

The Sixth Circuit, in United States versus Warner, indicates that the antagonistic defenses must present some sort of conflict that is irreconcilable. I don't find that there is a basis for severance just because of antagonistic defenses, and that ground for the motion does not persuade.

The Bruton problem is more substantial here. I have taken a look at the statements. The statement would be admissible against Mr. Lazeki at trial under Rule 105. Rule 105 -- that's Evidence Rule 105, says that evidence admissible against one person can come in with a limiting instruction, but if a limiting instruction is ineffective, then the rule of balancing unfair prejudice and probative value engages, Rule 403.

The prejudicial effect of such a statement is tied directly to the Sixth Amendment confrontation right, and hence, we have a Bruton problem.

Redacting the statements sometimes solves the problem, but just taking a look at the Government's responses and looking at the proposed redactions, I'm not particularly persuaded that they would be effective in curing the prejudice enuring to the other defendants in the case.

Redaction and sanitizing statements like this is always a messy business. The decisions usually are best made contextually. But my solution here, if I deny severance, which the Government urges me to do, is to simply exclude the statements that I find to be harmful.

I'm not going to give an advanced ruling on which of these statements can come in and can't right now because, as I said, context is important.

But I will deny the motion to sever Mr. King's case

from the rest of the defendants for a joint trial, warning

```
2
      the Government, however, that the evidence that they may want
 3
      to offer in the form of Mr. Lazeki's statements may not be
 4
     received at the appropriate time.
 5
               With that said, however, the motion is denied.
 6
               Now, I don't believe I have any other motions on the
 7
     docket that are --
 8
               MR. LaRENE: Judge, the adjournment motion. The
 9
     motion to adjourn the trial date was noticed for today, Judge.
10
               THE COURT: Mr. LaRene, I don't think I recognize
11
      adjournment motions. That's my policy.
12
               MR. LaRENE: You don't recognize -- you can't see
13
     them?
14
               THE COURT:
                          I'm sorry. I can't hear you. Did you
15
      say "adjournment"?
16
               MR. LaRENE: Yes. I said joint motion. Joint
17
     motion.
18
               THE COURT: Oh, all right.
               MR. LaRENE: Perhaps that will make it easier to
19
20
      find.
21
               THE COURT: Yeah. No, in all seriousness, this is a
22
     motion that basically circumstances will take care of.
23
     have a trial date on November -- what is it?
24
               MR. LaRENE: November 3, Judge.
25
               THE COURT: Yeah. The likelihood of this trial
```

```
1
     proceeding ahead on November 3 in this courthouse is nil.
 2
               MR. LaRENE: Understood.
 3
               THE COURT: I can set a trial date. I think you
 4
     wanted something in April. Isn't that what you asked for?
 5
               MR. LaRENE: We all sort of got together and in a
 6
      series of e-mail communications came up with a date of
 7
     April 12 or thereafter that basically accommodated all
 8
     counsels' schedules. And I don't remember what -- I don't
 9
      remember the details at this time.
               THE COURT: You say "all," meaning including the
10
11
     Government?
12
               MR. LaRENE: Including the Government, Judge.
13
               THE COURT: And so you were of one mind?
14
               MR. LaRENE: It's hard to believe, I know, but I
15
     believe it is true in this case.
16
               THE COURT: Okay. And so you made phone calls, you
17
      say?
18
               MR. Larene: We -- I think it was mostly e-mails.
               THE COURT: All right. Well, still, that's the overt
19
20
      act.
21
               MR. LaRENE: That's the overt act. That's right.
22
      That's right.
23
               THE COURT: You know, I think I'm pretty comfortable,
24
      subject to my -- subject to a strenuous objection from my case
25
     manager, granting that motion and setting that date, just
```

for planning purposes, and excluding the time based upon the CARES Act and other exigencies that fall within the umbrella of the coronavirus problem. Hopefully by then we will have juries back in the building.

In fact, I spent all morning with a group going through to try to identify courtrooms that we could use so we could get jury trials started again, and the prospect of trying multi-defendant cases in this courthouse and trying to keep social distancing within the facilities that we have are quite daunting.

And I guess that I would include all of those observations in my finding to exclude the time between now and your new date. But I'll grant that motion.

MR. LaRENE: Thank you, sir.

THE COURT: And for planning purposes, I will enter an order.

Probably what I will do in the order is set a status conference in about 30 to 45 days that we can conduct not necessarily on the record and not with the necessity of defendants being present but with counsel present, so we can talk about some of the discovery problems and issues that have cropped up today and production and how things are going.

I don't believe that there are any other pretrial motions except Ms. Peterson's severance and venue motion, which is Docket Number 63, that I have under advisement right

```
But there is nothing else that I think I have to decide.
1
 2
              Do you agree, Ms. Dubal?
 3
              MR. LaRENE: I think that's correct, Judge.
 4
              THE COURT: Mr. LaRene agrees.
 5
              Does the Government agree?
 6
              MS. DUBAL: Yes, your Honor. Thank you.
7
              THE COURT: All right. All right. Okay.
8
     there anything else that we need to discuss this afternoon?
 9
              From the Government first?
10
              MS. DUBAL: Not from the Government, your Honor.
11
     Thank you.
12
              THE COURT: Thank you.
13
              Mr. Donnini?
14
              MR. DONINNI: No, your Honor. Thank you.
15
              THE COURT: Mr. Eppel?
16
              MR. EPPEL:
                          Sorry. No, your Honor.
17
              THE COURT: And Ms. Webster?
18
              MS. WEBSTER: Nothing further. Thank you.
              THE COURT: Mr. Burdick?
19
20
              MR. BURDICK: No, sir. Nothing. Thank you.
21
              THE COURT: All right. And Mr. LaRene, you said no.
22
              MR. LaRENE: No, sir.
23
              THE COURT: And Mr. Berman?
              MR. BERMAN: No, your Honor. Thank you.
24
25
              THE COURT: All right. Thank you all. I appreciate
```

```
you participating in this fashion. I hope you all stay well
 2
      and safe.
 3
               Court is adjourned.
                    (Proceedings adjourned at 4:11 p.m.)
 4
 5
 6
 7
 8
 9
                       CERTIFICATE OF COURT REPORTER
10
11
12
             I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript
13
     from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.
14
15
                  s/ Rene L. Twedt
                                                 October 14, 2020
     RENE L. TWEDT, CSR-2907, RDR, CRR, CRC
                                                   Date
16
         Federal Official Court Reporter
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
```